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Abstract. A software supply chain attack is characterized by the injec-
tion of malicious code into a software package in order to compromise
dependent systems further down the chain. Recent years saw a number
of supply chain attacks that leverage the increasing use of open source
during software development, which is facilitated by dependency man-
agers that automatically resolve, download and install hundreds of open
source packages throughout the software life cycle.
This paper presents a dataset of 174 malicious software packages that
were used in real-world attacks on open source software supply chains,
and which were distributed via the popular package repositories npm,
PyPI, and RubyGems. Those packages, dating from November 2015
to November 2019, were manually collected and analyzed. The paper
also presents two general attack trees to provide a structured overview
about techniques to inject malicious code into the dependency tree of
downstream users, and to execute such code at different times and under
different conditions.
This work is meant to facilitate the future development of preventive and
detective safeguards by open source and research communities.
Keywords: Application Security, Malware, Software Supply Chain.
1 Introduction
In general, software supply chain attacks aim to inject malicious code into a
software product. Frequently, attackers tamper with the end product of a given
vendor such that it carries a valid digital signature, as it is signed by the respective
vendor, and may be obtained by end-users through trusted distribution channels,
e.g. download or update sites.
A prominent example of such supply chain attacks is NotPetya, a ransomware
concealed in a malicious update of a popular Ukrainian accounting software [8].
In 2017, NotPetya targeted Ukrainian companies but also hit global corporations,
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caused damage worth billions of dollars and is said to be one of the most
devastating cyberattacks known today [30]. In the same year, a malicious version
of CCleaner, a popular maintenance tool for Microsoft Windows systems, was
downloadable from the vendor’s official website, and remained undetected for
more than a month. During this period it was downloaded around 2.3 million
times [28].
Another flavor of supply chain attacks aims at injecting the malicious code
into a dependency of a software vendor’s product. This attack vector was already
predicted by Elias Levy in 2003 [29], and recent years saw a number of real-world
attacks following that scheme. Such attacks become possible, because modern
software projects commonly depend on multiple open source packages, which
themselves introduce numerous transitive dependencies [2]. Such attacks abuse
the developers’ trust in the authenticity and integrity of packages hosted on
commonly used servers and their adoption of automated build systems that
encourage this practice [1].
A single open source package may be required by several thousands of open
source software projects [24], which makes open source packages a very attractive
target for software supply chain attacks. A recent attack on the npm package
event-stream demonstrates the potential reach of such attacks: The alleged
attacker was granted ownership of a prominent npm package simply by asking
the original developer to take over its maintenance. At that time, event-stream
was used by another 1,600 packages, and was in average downloaded 1.5 million
times a week [23].
Open source software supply chain attacks are comparable to the problem of
vulnerable open source packages which may pass their vulnerability to dependent
software projects. This is known as one of the OWASP Top-10 application
security risks [31]. However, in case of supply chain attacks, malicious code is
deliberately injected and attackers employ obfuscation and evasion techniques to
avoid detection by humans or program analysis tools.
The major contributions of this paper are as follows: First, the manual analysis
and categorization of a dataset with malicious code from 174 packages that were
used for real-world attacks on open source software supply chains between 2015
and 2019. Second, two attack trees that abstract the structure of such attacks,
and which were developed both on the basis of the dataset and by reviewing
and investigating potential attacks on and actual weaknesses of open source
ecosystems. Through the highlighting of possible entry points, the contributions
uncover protection requirements, and serve the further research and development
of detective and protective measures against supply chain attacks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes
related work and Section 3 outlines the methodology used for the two major
contributions of this paper. Section 4 presents the two attack trees and Section 5
presents the analysis and categorization of the actual code of 174 malicious
packages observed in the wild. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
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2 Related Work
Related work mostly covers vulnerable packages, which contain design flaws or
code errors that are accidentally introduced, without bad intention but through
negligence, and which may pose a potential security risk. In contrast to that,
malicious packages contain design flaws or code errors that have been implemented
selectively, with caution and the intention to be exploited or triggered at later
times in the software life cycle. Technically, malicious code and vulnerable code
may look identical, the main difference lies in the intention of the developer (or
lack thereof) and, in some cases, the use of evasion or obfuscation techniques to
hinder the detection of such code.
Malicious and vulnerable packages reside in the same ecosystem and live
through the same software life cycle. As such, related works that investigate
package reuse in open source ecosystems in general, or the impact and spread of
vulnerable packages in particular, also apply to malicious packages.
Decan, Mens, and Constantinou leveraged security reports in order to examine
how and when vulnerabilities in npm software packages are discovered and fixed.
In order to assess the effect on other packages hosted on npm, a dependency
graph was used. The key findings are that nearly half of the packages inherited
vulnerabilities from other packages, and that version pinning to vulnerable and
outdated packages are the main cause for such inherited vulnerabilities, even if
fixes are available. [14]
Zimmermann, Staicu, Tenny, and Pradel were able to verify these findings
and provide mitigation techniques. Highly popular packages and highly active
developers were identified as single point of failures. Thus, the authors propose to
raise developer awareness through training as well as automated code analysis. [38]
Pfretzschner and Othmane proposed a system to identify software supply
chain attacks in npm packages by static code analysis. The tool is able to detect
four kinds of attacks: Leakage of global variables, manipulation of global variables,
local function manipulation, and dependency-tree manipulation. However, the
authors failed to identify real-world examples of these attacks for evaluation. [32]
Garrett, Ferreira, Jia, Sunshine, and Ka¨stner proposed anomaly detection
through unsupervised learning in order to identify suspicious package updates. For
that purpose they collected over 700,000 packages from npm and normal behavior
was inferred from 1,500 randomly selected packages. The system reported 539
suspicious updates per week reducing manually inspection by 89%. [19]
Jukka Ruohonen examined vulnerable Python packages regarding their CVSS
(Common Vulnerability Scoring System) score and the respective weakness ac-
cording to CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration). An auto regressive model
was used to calculate how likely a new release is vulnerable based on previous
releases’ vulnerability. It was found that the prediction of this event is difficult
despite good statistical performance. However, the supply chain of a package was
not taken into consideration. [33]
While related work mostly focused on vulnerable packages and impact assess-
ment with regard to specific open source ecosystems, especially Node.js (npm),
this work considers malicious packages across several ecosystems.
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3 Methodology
It is important to distinguish between vulnerable and malicious packages. As said,
vulnerable packages may contain design flaws or code errors that are accidentally
introduced, without bad intention but through negligence, and which may pose a
potential security risk. According to the Cambridge Dictionary malicious means
,,intended to cause damage to a computer system, or to steal private information
from a computer system”. Technically, malicious and vulnerable coding can be
similar or even identical, thus, the main difference lies in the attacker’s intention.
The contribution of this work is two-fold: A systematic description of possible
attacks using attack trees, and a dataset of malicious packages used in real-world
attacks.
Attack trees are able to represent attacks against a system. The primary goal
of the attack is used as root node and child nodes represent possible ways to
achieve that goal. The attack trees described in Section 4 have been created
in an iterative fashion on the basis of actual malicious packages observed in
the wild, and on the basis of potential attacks and weaknesses described by
security researchers and practitioners. The first attack tree has the objective to
inject malicious code into software supply chains of downstream users, while the
second aims at triggering its malicious behavior in different circumstances. Each
malicious package and information source is manually analyzed and, provided
sufficient information is available, mapped to a node of each attack tree. If no
fitting node is present, a new one is added. This iterative approach makes sure
that the nodes of the attack trees represent realistic attack vectors. However, the
approach has the disadvantage that those trees are not complete, as they do not
reflect attack vectors that have not been observed or otherwise described.
The second contribution is the dataset. It is analyzed in Section 5 and
comprises the subset of malicious packages used in real-world attacks for which
the actual malicious code could be obtained (typically a compressed archive). The
compilation took place between July 2nd and August 2nd, 2019 and was updated
on 27th of January 2020. The programming languages JavaScript with its package
repository npm, Java (Maven Central), Python (PyPI), PHP (Packagist) and
Ruby (RubyGems), which are the most popular languages according to newly
created GitHub repositories in 2018 [18], are covered by the dataset.
During that time, the vulnerability database Snyk4, language-specific security
advisories, and research blogs were reviewed to identify malicious packages and
possible attack vectors. It must be noted that these sources solely mention the
packages’ names and affected versions, thus, the actual malicious code has to be
downloaded from other sources. However, such malicious packages are typically not
available anymore on standard package repositories of the respective programming
language, e.g. npm or PyPI. Instead, where possible, they were retrieved from
deprecated mirrors, internet archives, and public research repositories. If the
code of a malicious package could be retrieved, it was analyzed and categorized
manually. This was done in order to confirm the packages’ maliciousness, map
4 https://snyk.io
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them to the existing attack trees or extend them if necessary. The publication
of malicious versions of a package are dated according to Libraries.io5, a service
that monitors package releases across all major package repositories. Advisories
and public incident reports are used to date the public disclosure of the malicious
package.
4 Threat Analysis and Attack Trees
This section starts with a high-level introduction of activities and systems related
to open source software development projects, and concludes with the presentation
of two attack trees.
In general, attack trees allow for a systematic description of attacks against
any kind of system6. The root node of a given tree thereby corresponds to the
attacker’s top-level goal, and child nodes represent alternative ways to achieve it.
The top-level goals of the attack trees presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are to
inject malicious code into the software supply chain, thus, into a dependency of a
development project, and to trigger that malicious code in different circumstances.
4.1 Open Source Development Projects
In a typical development environment as visualized in Figure 1, Maintainers are
members of a development project who administer the depicted systems, provide,
review and approve contributions, or define and trigger build processes. Open
source projects also receive code contributions from contributors, which may be
reviewed and merged into the project’s code base by maintainers.
The build process ingests the source code and other resources of a project,
and has the goal to produce software artifacts. These artifacts are subsequently
published such that they become available to end-users and other development
projects.
The project resources reside in a version control system (VCS), e.g. Git, and
are copied to the local file system of the build system. Among those resources is
a declaration of direct dependencies, which is analyzed at the start of the build
process by a dependency manager in order to establish the complete dependency
tree with all direct and transitive dependencies. As all of them are required
during the build, for instance, at compile time or during test execution, they are
downloaded (pulled) from package repositories such as PyPI7 for Python, npm8
for Node.js, or Maven Central9 for Java.
At the end of a successful build, program code and other resources are assem-
bled into one or more build artifacts, which are potentially signed and eventually
5 https://libraries.io
6 https://www.schneier.com/academic/archives/1999/12/attack trees.html
7 https://pypi.org
8 https://www.npmjs.com
9 https://search.maven.org/
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Fig. 1. High-level development and build activities.
published. Either to distribution platforms like app stores such that they may be
consumed by end-users or to package repositories for other development projects.
Such project environments are subject to numerous trust boundaries, and
many threats target the respective data flows, data stores and processes. Managing
those threats may be challenging even when considering only the environment of a
single software project. When considering supply chains with dozens or hundreds
of dependencies, it is important to notice that such an environment exist for
every single dependency, making it obvious that the combined attack surface
of such projects is considerably larger than that of software entirely developed
in-house.
Taking the perspective of attackers, malevolent actors have the intention to
compromise the security of the build or runtime environment of software projects
through the infection of one or more upstream open source packages, each one
of which is developed in environments comparable to Figure 1. How to reach
this goal is described in the following sections by means of two attack trees that
provide a structured overview about attack paths to inject a malicious code into
dependency trees of downstream users and to trigger its execution at different
times or under different conditions.
4.2 Injection of Malicious Code
The attack tree illustrated by Figure 2 is an extension and refinement of the graph
presented by Pfretzschner and Othmane [32], and has as top-level goal to inject
malicious code into the dependency tree of downstream packages. Thus, the goal is
satisfied once a package with malicious code is available on a distribution platform,
e.g. package repository, and it became a direct or transitive dependency of one
or more other packages. As such, this type of code injection differs from other
injection attacks, many of which exploit security vulnerabilities at application
runtime, e.g. buffer overflow attacks that become possible due to a lack of user
input sanitization.
To inject a package into dependency trees an attacker may follow two possible
strategies, he may either infect an existing package or submit a new package.
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Fig. 2. Attack tree to inject malicious code into dependency trees.
Obviously, developing and publishing a new rogue package using a name that
is not used by anybody else avoids interference with other legitimate project
maintainers. However, such a package has to be discovered and referenced by
downstream users in order to end up in the dependency trees of victim packages.
This may be achieved using a name similar to existing package names (typosquat-
ting) [4,34,3,35,15,16], or by developing and promoting a trojan horse [12]. An
attacker might also use the opportunity to reuse the identifier of an existing
project, package, or user account withdrawn by its original and legitimate main-
tainer (use after free) [10].
The second strategy is to infect an existing package that already has users,
contributors and maintainers. The attacker might choose packages for different
reasons, e.g. a significant number or specific group of downstream users. However,
the data gathered until now does not allow to validate corresponding hypotheses
(c.f. Section 5). Once the attacker choose a package to infect, the malicious code
may be injected into the sources, during the build, or into the package repository.
Open source projects live and strive through community contributions, thus,
attackers can mimic benign project contributors. For instance, an attacker may
pretend to solve an existing issue by creating a pull request (PR) with a bug fix
or a seemingly useful feature or dependency [20]. The latter could be used to
create a dependency on an attacker-controller package created from scratch using
the techniques described beforehand. In any case, this PR has to be approved
and merged into the main code branch by a legitimate project maintainer.
Alternatively, an attacker may commit malicious code into the project’s code
base all by himself by using weak or compromised credentials or security-sensitive
API tokens [27,22]. Furthermore, attackers may become maintainer themselves
through social engineering [23]. In all cases, no matter how the malicious code
has been added to the sources, it will become part of an official package during
the next release build — regardless where that build happens. Compared to
attacks on build systems and package repositories, malicious code in VCS is more
accessible to manual or automated reviews of commits or entire repositories.
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The compromise of build systems typically entails tampering with resources
used throughout the build process, e.g. compilers, build plugins or network
services such as proxies or DNS servers. Such resources may be compromised if
the build system, be it a developer’s work station or a build server like Jenkins10,
is subject to vulnerabilities, or if insecure communication channels are such that
attackers can manipulate the package download from repositories [1,36]. The
release builds of the targeted package may also run on a shared build system and
thus used by multiple projects [21]. Depending on the setup, such build processes
may not run in isolation, hence resources such as package caches or build plugins
are shared between the builds of different projects. In this case, an attacker may
compromise shared resources during a malicious build of a project under his
control such that the targeted project is compromised at a later point in time.
Even popular package repositories are still subject to simple but severe secu-
rity vulnerabilities. While all the other attack vectors seek to inject malicious
code into a single package, the exploit of vulnerabilities in package repositories
themselves puts the entire repository with all its packages at risk [25,26]. Similar
to injecting the code in the sources, the attacker may use weak or compromised
credentials [7,37,17,9,11] or gain maintainer authorizations through social engi-
neering [23] in order to publish malicious versions of legitimate packages. As the
former has been used in numerous attacks, initiatives such as the badge program
of the Core Infrastructure Initiative [13] give the official recommendation to
project maintainers to enable two-factor authentication.
Further, an attacker may upload malicious package versions to alternative
repositories or repository mirrors [6,5] that are not provisioned by the original
maintainers, and wait for victims pulling dependencies from there. Supposedly,
such repositories and mirrors are less popular, and the attack is dependent on
the victim’s configuration, e.g. the order of repositories queried for dependencies
or the use of mirrors.
4.3 Execution of Malicious Code
Once malicious code is present in some project’s dependency tree, the attack tree
illustrated by Figure 3 has the top-level goal to trigger the malicious code under
different conditions. Such conditions may be used to evade detection and/or
target attacks towards specific users and systems.
Malicious code may trigger at different life cycle phases of the infected package
and its downstream users (c.f. Section 5.3). If malicious code is contained in
test cases, the attack primarily targets the contributors and maintainers of the
infected package, which run such tests on their developer work stations and
build systems. In many of the recorded attacks, malicious code is contained
in install scripts, which are automatically executed during package installation
by downstream users or their dependency managers. Such install scripts exist
for Python and Node.js, and may be used to perform pre- or post-installation
activities. Malicious code in install scripts puts the contributors and maintainers
10 https://jenkins.io
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Fig. 3. Attack tree to execute malicious code.
of downstream packages as well as their end users at risk. Malicious code may also
be triggered at runtime of downstream packages, which requires that it is invoked
as part of the regular control flow of the victim package. In Python, this may be
achieved by including malicious code in init .py, which is invoked through
import statements. In JavaScript, this may be achieved by monkey-patching
(modifying) existing methods. The specifics of individual programming languages,
package managers, etc. may easily be covered by refining this goal.
Independent of the life cycle phase, the execution of malicious behavior may
always trigger (unconditioned) or only if certain conditions are met (conditional
execution). As for any other malware, conditioned execution complicates the dy-
namic detection of malicious open source packages, since the respective conditions
may not be known, understood or met in sandbox environments. Conditioning
the execution on the application state is a common means to evade detection,
e.g. in test environments or dedicated malware analysis sandboxes. Again, the
specifics of individual build systems may be covered by respective sub goals, e.g.
the presence of Jenkins environment variables indicates that malicious code is
triggered during a build rather than in a production environment. Moreover,
conditions may be related to a specific victim package, e.g. check a specific
application state such as the balance of a crypto wallet [23]. Heavy reuse of open
source packages may result in the fact that a malicious package ends up in the
dependency tree of many downstream packages. If only certain packages are of
interest to attackers, they may condition the code execution on the nodes of a
given dependency tree at hand [23]. Furthermore, the operating system used may
serve as condition.
5 Description of the Dataset
The dataset contains 174 packages and was compiled according to our methodology
as described in Section 3.
A total number of 469 malicious packages could be identified. Additionally,
59 packages were found that could be identified as proof of concept (published
by researchers) and hence are excluded from further examination. Eventually,
we were able to obtain at least one affected version for 174 packages. The rate
of successful downloads of malicious packages for npm is 109/374 (29.14%), for
10 M. Ohm et al.
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of publication and disclosure.
PyPI 28/44 (63.64%), for RubyGems 37/41 (90.24%), and for Maven Central
0/10 (0.00%). All statements and statistics below refers to the set of downloaded
packages.
5.1 Composition and Structure
The dataset consist of 62.6% packages published on npm and hence are written for
Node.js in JavaScript. The remaining packages were published via PyPI (16.1%,
Python) and via RubyGems (21.3%, Ruby). Unfortunately, a malicious Java
package targeting Android developers could not be downloaded. For PHP, we
were not able to identify any malicious package at all.
The complete dataset is available for free on GitHub11. However, access
will be granted on justified request only due to ethical reasons. The dataset
is structured as follows: package-manager/package-name/version/package.file.
Malicious packages are grouped by their originating package manager on the first
level. Further, multiple affected versions of one package are grouped under the
respective package’s name. As example for the affected version of the well-known
case of event-stream it is: npm/event-stream/3.3.6/event-stream-3.3.6.tgz.
5.2 Temporal Aspects
Figure 4 visualizes the publication dates of the collected packages which range
from November 2015 to November 2019. The publication and disclosure dates are
identified according to the upload time of the package and the publication date
of the corresponding advisory identifying the respective version as malicious (cf.
Section 3). A trend for an increasing number of published malicious packages is
apparent. While malicious packages for PyPI are known to date back to 2015 and
since then are increasing, npm gained a massive amount of malicious packages in
2017, and malicious packages on RubyGems experienced a boom in 2019.
11 https://dasfreak.github.io/Backstabbers-Knife-Collection
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Fig. 6. Trigger of malicious behavior separated per package repository and overall.
Figure 5 shows that on average a malicious package is available for
209 days (min = −1,max = 1, 216, ρ = 258, x˜ = 67) before being publicly
reported. A minimum of −1 days was reached for npm/eslint-config-airbnb-
standard/2.1.1 which was affected by npm/eslint-scope/3.7.2. Even though the
infection of npm/eslint-scope/3.7.2 was known, the package was still in use due to
the developers’ re-packaging strategy. The maximum of 1, 216 days was reached
by npm/rpc-websocket/0.7.7 which took over an abandoned package and went
undetected for a long period.
In general this shows that packages tend to be available for a longer period.
While PyPI has the highest average online time, that period varies the most for
npm, and RubyGems tends to detect malicious packages more timely.
5.3 Trigger of Malicious Behavior
Malicious behavior of a package may be triggered at different points of interaction
with the package. Most typically, a package may be installed, tested, or executed.
A separation per package repository is visualized in Figure 6. It illustrates that
the poor handling of arbitrary code during install yields the most used infection
vector.
It is apparent that most malicious packages (56%) start their rou-
tines on installation. This can be triggered by the package repositories’ install
command, e.g. npm install <package>. That invokes code as defined in the
package’s definition, e.g. package.json and setup.py. This code might be arbi-
trary to do whatever is necessary to install the package, e.g. download additional
files. This seems very common for malicious packages on PyPI.
In contrast to that, Ruby does not implement such install logic and hence no
packages for that case exist in Ruby. Thus, all found packages on RubyGems use
runtime as trigger. Overall, 43% of the packages expose their malicious behavior
during the program’s runtime, i.e.˙ when invoked from another function.
For 1% of the packages the test routines are used as trigger. Invoking the test
routine of npm/ladder-text-js/1.0.0 would execute sudo rm -rf /* which may
delete all your files.
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5.4 Conditional Execution
As seen in Figure 7, 41% of the packages check for a condition be-
fore triggering further execution. This may depend on the application’s
state, e.g. check whether the main application is in production mode (e.g.
RubyGems/paranoid2/1.1.6 ), resolvability of a domain name (e.g. npm/logsymbles/2.2.0 ),
or the amount contained in a crypto wallet (e.g. npm/flatmap-stream/0.1.1 ).
Other techniques are to check whether another package is present in the
dependency tree (e.g. npm/load-from-cwd-or-npm/3.0.2 ) or whether the package
is executed on a certain operating system (e.g. PyPI/libpeshka/0.6 ).
The majority of packages published on PyPI and RubyGems execute uncon-
ditionally. For npm the ratio of conditional and unconditional execution is nearly
equal.
5.5 Injection of Malicious Package
In Figure 8 it is apparent that most (61%) malicious packages mimic
existing packages’ names via typosquatting. A deeper analysis of that
phenomenon revealed that the Levenshtein distance of an average typosquatting
package to its target is 2.3 (min = 0,max = 11, ρ = 2.05, x˜ = 1.0). In some cases
the typosquatting target is available from another package repository, e.g. the
Linux package repository apt under the exact same name. This is for instance
the case for python-sqlite. The maximum distance of 11 is reached in the case
of pythonkafka which targeted kafka-python. Common techniques are adding or
removing hyphens, leaving out single letters, or exchange of letters that are often
mistyped. An word that is targeted exceptionally often is ,,color” or, respectively,
its British English counterpart: ,,colour”.
The second most common injection method was the infection of an existing
package. This may often be achieved with compromised credentials for the
repository system (e.g. npm/eslint-scope/3.7.2 ). In most cases, the exact infection
technique could not be determined in retrospect. This is because the related
source is often removed from the version control system or no further details
about the injection are made public. Hence, these packages are listed as infect
existing package.
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Another injection technique is to create a new package which consist of nothing
but the malicious package to which we refer to as trojan horse. No meaningful
typo-squatting targets where found for these packages. These packages could be
used in conjunction with an infected existing package or standalone.
5.6 Primary Objective
As shown in Figure 9, most packages aim at data exfiltration. Commonly,
the data of interest is the content of /etc/passwd, ∼/.ssh/*, ∼/.npmrc, or
∼/.bash history. Furthermore, malicious packages try to exfiltrate environment
variables (which might contain access tokens) and general system information.
Another popular target (7 reported packages, 3 of them available in our dataset)
is the token for the voice and text chat application Discord. A Discord user’s
account may be linked to credit card information and thus be used for financial
fraudulence.
Moreover, 34% of the packages function as Dropper to download second
stage payload. Another 5% open a backdoor, i.e.˙ reverse shell, to a remote
server and await further instructions. 3% aim to cause a denial of service by
exhausting resources through fork bombs and file deletion (e.g. npm/destroyer-of-
worlds/1.0.0 ) or breaking functionality of other packages (e.g. npm/load-from-cwd-
or-npm/3.0.2 ). Only 3% have financial gain as primary objective by for instance
running a cryptominer in the background (e.g. npm/hooka-tools/1.0.0 ) or stealing
cryptocurrency directly (e.g. pip/colourama/0.1.6 ). In addition, combinations of
the above mentioned objectives might occur.
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Fig. 8. Injection technique used to introduce the malicious package into a package per
package repository and overall.
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5.7 Targeted Operating System
In order to identify the targeted OS, the source code was manually analyzed for
hints which may be as explicit as an if–then construct like if platform.system()
is ’Windows’ as used in e.g. PyPI/openvc/1.0.0 or implicit by relying on re-
sources only available on certain OS. These resources may be for instance files
containing sensible information like .bashrc etc. (cf. Section 5.6, npm/font-
scrubber/1.2.2 ) or executables like /bin/sh (e.g. npm/rpc-websocket/0.7.11 ).
The analysis of the packages for their targeted operating system (OS) revealed
that most packages (53%) are agnostic, i.e.˙ do not rely on OS-specific
functions. The analysis was done on the initial visible code of the package and
thus the targeted OS of the second stage payload remains unknown. However,
Unix-like systems seem to be targeted more often than Windows and macOS,
since build environments are commonly operated on such an OS.
There is only one known case of macOS being the target in which the package
npm/angluar-cli/0.0.1 performs a denial of service attack on the McAfee virus
scanner for macOS by deleting and modifying its files.
5.8 Obfuscation
Malicious actors often try to disguise the presence of their code, i.e.˙ hindering
its detection by sight. In our dataset nearly the half of the packages (49%)
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Fig. 11. Employed obfuscation technique per package repository and overall.
employ some kind of obfuscation. Most often a different encoding (Base64
or Hex) is used to disguise the presence of malicious functions or suspicious
variables such as domain names.
A technique often used by benign packages to compress source code and
thus save bandwidth is minification. However, this is a welcome opportunity for
malicious actors to sneak in extra code which is unreadable for humans (e.g.
npm/tensorplow/1.0.0 ). Another way to hide variables is to use string sampling.
This requires a seemingly random string which is used to rebuild meaningful
strings by picking letter by letter (e.g. npm/ember-power-timepicker/1.0.8 ).
In one case the malicious functions are hidden by encryption. The package
npm/flatmap-stream/0.1.1 leverages AES256 with the short description of the
targeted package as decryption key. That way, the malicious behavior is solely
exposed when used by the targeted package. Furthermore, combinations of the
above mentioned techniques exist.
5.9 Clusters
In order to infer on the presence of attack campaigns, all packages were analyzed
for reuse of malicious code or dependency relationships. This way, it was possible
to identify 21 clusters for which at least two packages either have similar
malicious code in common, or an attacker-controlled package depends on another
one with the actual malicious code. In total, 157 of the 174 packages (90%) belong
to a cluster. On average a cluster comprises 7.28 packages (min = 2,max =
36, ρ = 8.96, x˜ = 3).
A cross comparison of publications dates of packages within one cluster
revealed that the average temporal distance between publications is 42 days,
6:50:18 (min = 1:29:40,max = 353 days, 11:17:02, ρ = 78 days, 0:43:10, x˜ =
7 days, 15:24:51). The biggest cluster was formed around the crossenv case [34]
counting 36 packages published with an average temporal distance of 5.98 days.
It was published in two waves, 11 packages within 15 minutes on 19th of July
2017 and another 25 packages within 30 minutes on 1st of August 2017.
The cluster having publication dates that are 353 days apart consists of the
two packages PyPI/jeilyfish/0.7.0 and PyPI/python3-dateutil/2.9.1. The first
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was published on 12/11/18 12:26 AM and contained code that download a script
to steal SSH and GPG Keys from Windows machines. It went undetected for a
long time until the second package was published on 11/29/19 11:43 AM which
did not contain malicious code itself but referenced the first package. The cluster
was reported and deleted on 12/12/19 05:53 PM.
While most clusters solely contain packages from one package repository, it
was possible to find a cluster that mainly contained packages from npm but
also RubyGems/active-support/5.2.0 from RubyGems. This means that attack
campaigns exist or at least techniques flow across multiple package repositories.
5.10 Code Review of Two Malicious Packages
For vivid illustration, npm/jqeury/3.3.1 (left) and RubyGems/active-support/5.2.0
(right) will be discussed in Figure 12. They both belong to the same cluster
according to our manual assessment of code similarity, even though they were
published on different repositories.
6 Conclusions
From an attacker’s point of view, package repositories represent a reliable and
scalable malware distribution channel. So far, the repositories of Node.js (npm)
and Python (PyPI) are the primary targets of malicious packages, supposedly due
to the fact that malicious code can be easily triggered during package installation.
There already exist a number of countermeasures that may be implemented by
different stakeholders, e.g. multi-factor authentication for open source maintainers,
version pinning and disablement of install scripts for open source users, or the
isolation of build processes and hardening of build servers. However, despite
raising general awareness among stakeholders, such countermeasures must be
more accessible and, where possible, enforced by default in order to prevent open
source software supply chain attacks. The following paragraphs briefly summarize
and reflect our findings and future work.
6.1 Findings
Two attack trees were derived from observed cases and related work. One for
the injection of a malicious package into the open source ecosystem and one
for the execution of the malicious code. These attack trees allow for systematic
description of past and future attacks. We were able to create the first manually
curated dataset of malicious open source packages that have been used in real-
world attacks. It consists of 174 malicious packages (62.6% npm, 16.1% PyPI,
21.3% RubyGems) ranging from November 2015 to November 2019. Manual
analysis revealed that most packages (56%) trigger their malicious behavior
on installation, and 41% use further conditions to determine whether to run
or not. More than half of the packages (61%) leverage typosquatting to inject
themselves into the ecosystem, and data exfiltration is the most common goal
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(55%). The packages typically are agnostic to operating systems (53%), and often
employ obfuscations (49%) to hide themselves. Finally, we were able to detect
multiple clusters of malicious packages through reused code even across different
programming languages. The dataset gives insight and is available for free to
facilitate research in the area of prevention, detection, and mitigation of software
supply chain attacks.
6.2 Limitation
Our dataset is highly biased towards malicious packages that are written in
JavaScript for Node.js and published on npm which is due to npm’s enormous
size and popularity. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain malicious packages
for Java (Maven Central) and PHP (Packagist). Furthermore, roughly 34% of
the malicious packages are droppers with the goal to download a second stage
payload, which might not be available anymore. One might notice that we listed
the deployment in alternative repository or mirrors as injection method but
downloaded most of the packages from such sources. While it is possible that
these packages have been altered to be malicious, the package’s presence in our
dataset is still valid as the package would be malicious is both cases. Furthermore,
the ,,intended” maliciousness according to the advisories was verified through
manual analysis.
6.3 Future Work
It will be important to collect a comprehensive set of existing safeguards, and
perform a gap analysis with regard to the attack vectors described in Section 4.
Even though many safeguards already exist, some are hardly used in practice,
and others will need to be developed. For example, we expect new techniques
and tools to scan entire package repositories for suspicious packages, e.g. on the
basis of the observation that malicious code is reused across packages of the
same campaign, and even across languages. In this context, the manually curated
and labeled dataset allows for supervised learning approaches that support the
automated and repository-wide search for malicious packages. Moreover, with
regard to existing and new mitigation strategies, the presented dataset may pose
as a benchmark. Last, acknowledging the importance of a comprehensive and
up-to-date dataset, it will be necessary to continue its curation – contributions
are welcome.
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